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ABSTRACT
The spectacle of Bitcoin has largely overshadowed the development of the
cryptocurrency’s underlying structure – the blockchain. The blockchain is a type of
digital ledger that performs a number of traditional record-keeping functions in a
more efficient and reliable manner. Organizations around the globe continue to
invest heavily in blockchain technology for a myriad of purposes. To fund these
innovative projects, many organizations hold an Initial Coin Offering (“ICO”) in
which “tokens” -- a blockchain’s primary means of exchanging value, proving
ownership, and/or paying for network services -- are sold to purchasers in exchange
for U.S. dollars.
In many ways, ICOs are the modern equivalent of a traditional initial public
offering (“IPO”). Tokens are often bought as a financial investment, with purchasers
hoping to capitalize on cryptocurrency mania and reap a large return. Indeed, some
ICOs have exploited overzealous investors by holding fraudulent ICOs without any
real intention of developing a functioning blockchain network. As a result, the
Securities and Exchange Commission largely regulates ICOs in the same manner as
IPOs, imposing stringent reporting requirements and liability on startups and
developers.
However, these bad apples are in the minority and moreover, certain tokens sold
through ICOs do not meet the classic definition of a “security.” Utility tokens, in
particular, are functionally distinct from a traditional security with any rise in value
being incidental to the token’s primary utility. Treating all crypto-tokens sold
through ICOs as securities stifles development by imposing onerous requirements
upon novice developers. Current securities law exemptions are inadequate and given
the popularity and success of many ICOs, their offerings should not be forced into
poorly tailored regulations. The SEC should acknowledge the unique nature of
certain blockchain tokens and provide tailored guidance for future ICOs if this
burgeoning industry is to flourish.
INTRODUCTION
“You can call me Floyd Crypto Mayweather from now on” tweeted the
flamboyant professional boxer.1 Bullish on cryptocurrencies, Mayweather urged his
followers to purchase the coins offered by Centra Tech in its Initial Coin Offering
(“ICO”).2 Social media guru DJ Khaled quickly followed suit, describing Centra
Tech and its new crypto-token as a “Game changer.”3 However, the two celebrities
failed to disclose the payments each received in exchange for promoting the ICO.
Several months later, the SEC filed a civil action against Centra Tech for holding a
fraudulent ICO.4 In conjunction with its enforcement action against Centra Tech,
the SEC ordered Mayweather and Khaled to disgorge their payments with interest. 5
Press Release, Two Celebrities Charged with Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-268 [https://perma.cc/BF8W-3HDC].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
1
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Both agreed not to promote cryptocurrencies or other securities for several years. 6
Through these celebrity endorsements, Centra Tech hoped to capitalize on the mania
surrounding cryptocurrencies and attract customers to its coin offering.
While Centra Tech was ultimately just another fraudulent financial scheme, to
many, cryptocurrencies are the printing press of the modern age—a currency for a
globalized generation distrustful of traditional institutions. Bitcoin has grabbed
headlines with tales of fortunes won and lost, while the technical foundation of
cryptocurrencies—the blockchain—has evolved, quietly seeping into new markets
and industries. The blockchain is a type of electronic ledger, a system for verifying
transactions, maintaining online identities, and transferring digital assets. 7 In many
ways, the blockchain is nothing new, providing the same functions as an accountant’s
books, a company’s document software, or a bank’s transaction log. It verifies and
proves that buyers have the money to spend and sellers actually deliver the product. 8
What distinguishes the blockchain from traditional forms of record-keeping is its
integrity, security, and decentralized structure–blockchains remove intermediaries
from transactions and record keeping, seeding control to the parties while providing
an immutable record of those parties’ actions. 9
Many blockchain networks utilize cryptographic tokens (“crypto-tokens”) as
part of their procedures and protocols. These tokens serve many purposes: as an
incentive to encourage active participation in the network, as a marker to signal an
ownership interest, and as a fuel to power applications and services. 10 Like Bitcoin,
crypto-tokens often have monetary value, a consequence of the token’s utility or the
success and size of the network. Thus, crypto-tokens can become appreciated assets
whose value may fluctuate over time. For new blockchain projects, the network’s
tokens may be the company’s most valuable asset. Quite recently, companies have
begun to raise capital through ICOs–a novel type of public sale. Similar to IPOs,
investors purchase a blockchain’s tokens using an agreed upon currency; the
company receives capital to further develop its network while the buyer receives an
appreciable asset.11 ICOs have exploded in popularity–since 2014 over twenty
billion in capital has been raised through initial coin offerings.12 Despite this success,
ICOs pose significant regulatory issues–the SEC has classified many ICOs as
investment contracts and labeled various crypto-tokens as securities.
This Comment addresses the current regulatory limbo facing ICOs and
companies utilizing blockchain technology. Increased oversight is overdue as
blockchain technology continues to grow and adapt, often in ways that harm
investors and companies as seen in a number of recent enforcement actions, failed
6

Id.
See generally Klint Finley & Gregory Barber, The WIRED Guide to the Blockchain, WIRED (Jul. 9,
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/6435-MKYZ].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Shermin Voshmgir, Tokens, Cryptocurrencies & Other Cryptoassets, BLOCKCHAIN HUB BERLIN
(2019), https://blockchainhub.net/tokens/ [https://perma.cc/B92P-4MU9].
11
Jake Frankenfield, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp [https://perma.cc/5PBP-HG6V].
12
ICO Tracker – Summary Statistics, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker
[https://perma.cc/W5F7-EKFT] (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
7
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offerings, and consumer fraud. Furthermore, the meteoric ascension of Bitcoin and
Ethereum, the world’s most popular cryptocurrencies, attracted hordes of new
investors looking to earn quick profits and returns. While certain blockchains and
their respective tokens do present as security offerings, to characterize all tokens as
securities would injure many blockchain initiatives. Without narrowly tailored
regulations, startups and emerging blockchain technology will be stifled by
registration requirements and the threat of fines and sanctions. The SEC has a rare
opportunity to craft regulations that will accommodate the unique nature of
blockchain technology and ICOs while still protecting investors from fraud and other
economic harm. ICOs need not be another example of the law failing to catch up
with technology. This Comment will attempt to provide recommendations to meet
this admittedly lofty goal.
Because blockchain technology is technologically complex, it is first important
to establish a firm foundation before applying modern securities laws. Thus, Part I
will introduce blockchain technology broadly, beginning with a brief history of its
origins as a component of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Part I will also explore
blockchain functionality and how its benefits are currently applied across various
markets. Part II will examine the structure of ICOs, their ostensible purpose, and
their execution. Part III will look at the SEC’s traditional framework for defining
and governing the sale of securities under the Howey Test. The Howey Test is
construed broadly and historically and has been applied to a number of nontraditional securities settings. However, the SEC has formally stated that some ICOs
may qualify as securities offerings, depending on a number of individualized factors
and circumstances. Part III will look closely at these factors as well as the various
actions (or lack thereof) the SEC has taken against ICOs. Finally, Part IV will
forecast the future of ICO regulations, including voluntary attempts by blockchain
networks to bring their offerings into compliance with U.S. law.
Defining ICOs as securities offerings and bringing them under the regulatory
umbrella of the SEC will have significant benefits to both individual and institutional
investors. The greater oversight will almost certainly eliminate the fraudulent
offerings and projects that currently plague the industry. However, it is this
Comment’s position that given the unique character of purpose of blockchain
technology, a blanket securities classification would prohibitively disrupt and
undermine the small start-ups looking to develop and market products that could
revolutionize global transactions.
SIGNIFICANCE OF A SECURITIES CLASSIFICATION
As a threshold matter, it is worth addressing the significance of registering
ICOs as securities. Given the consequences of running afoul of the SEC, some may
wonder why blockchain developers do not simply register their securities and abide
by the regulations governing their sale. Some larger-scale ICOs that are integrated
within larger companies certainly have the resources and legal counsel to do so
safely. However, for small-scale blockchain developers hoping to secure additional
funding, registering a token as a security comes with significant burdens. As one
commentator notes, “[r]egistration of a traditional underwritten public offering is
time consuming and expensive, and, once an issuer becomes public, carries with it
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extensive reporting requirements.”13 For one, Section Five of the Securities Act of
1933 (“‘33 Act”) prohibits the advertising or sale of any security in the absence of
an effective registration statement.14 Registration statements are detailed, requiring,
among other things, three years of audited financial statements including any debt
obligations, the number of shares, total market capitalization, etc.15 While the SEC
provides relaxed standards for “emerging growth companies,” even these reduced
standards mandate two years of audited financial history.16 Much of this information
is simply unavailable to early-stage blockchain companies who have yet to establish
a viable product, customer base, or a financial history complete enough to satisfy
registration requirements.
Additionally, virtually any party17 who helped to prepare the registration
statement is strictly liable in law or equity for any material misstatements contained
therein.18 While Section Eleven provides a safe harbor for non-expert statements
made in good faith,19 it is unlikely developers could take advantage of this immunity
given the highly technical nature of blockchain products–expert statements would
almost certainly be required in any registration statement. More significantly, Rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act prohibits any fraudulent act or omission in connection
with the sale of a security.20 While Rule 10b-5 requires that a plaintiff properly plead
all the necessary elements (including scienter), the Rule remains incredibly popular
in securities class actions because it contains an implied private right of action. 21
Rule 10b-5 poses a serious threat to ICOs registered with the SEC; powerful law
firms across the country scour the securities landscape for failed offerings, often
initiating specious class actions based solely on a security’s decline in value. For
example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme Court noted how
an objectively weak complaint still has substantial value to a plaintiff if he can move
past the dismissal and summary judgement stages:
[I]n the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information even a
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at
trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of
success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him
by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate
or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the
lawsuit.22

Given that blockchain technology is still in its infancy, it is inevitable that some
Kennedy Luvai, The End of the ICO Gold Rush: The Regulatory Squeeze on Token Offerings as a
Funding Mechanism for Blockchain-Related Ventures?, 31 UTAH B.J. 20, 20 (2018).
14
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
15
See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(1)–(32) (1998).
16
15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2) (2012).
17
Including every individual who signed the registration statement as well as the company’s directors,
accountants, engineers, appraisers or underwriters.
18
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)–(5) (1998).
19
See § 77k(b)(3).
20
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
21
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (characterizing Rule 10b-5 as
a “judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”).
22
Id. at 740.
13
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ICOs will collapse and fail, with any tokens losing their monetary value. These
failed offerings will be subject to a litany of lawsuits if ICOs are forced to abide by
securities regulations. Even a nominal decline in value–contrary to representations
made in a prospectus or registration statement–will trigger potential liability. Small
ICOs simply do not have the resources to defend such lawsuits and will needlessly
expend funds combating their claims.23 Furthermore, the SEC’s current registration
requirements impose financially onerous burdens on companies. One report by
PricewaterhouseCoopers found IPO registration requirements cost companies an
estimated $3.7 million.24 The average ICO will be unable to afford these costs.
I. BLOCKCHAIN HISTORY AND FUNCTIONALITY
A. Bitcoin Origins
Since its inception in 2009, the enigmatic cryptocurrency Bitcoin continues to
inspire technology zealots, irritate the Department of Justice, and above all, confuse
the public.25 Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin, envisioned
the cryptocurrency as a decentralized payment system for Internet commerce that
eschewed financial institutions or third-parties intermediaries.26 Bitcoin itself is
nothing more than a line of code, its value derived from the amount in circulation
and its use within the economy.27 Bitcoins are stored in virtual “wallets” consisting
of a “public” key and a “private” key. 28 The public key, as the name implies, is
publicly available, functioning as an address to which Bitcoins can be sent. 29 By
contrast, the private key is a closely guarded cryptographic secret because it permits
a wallet’s owner to access, spend, and/or transfer Bitcoins across the network. 30
However, because Bitcoin only exists electronically, the person to whom Bitcoins
are sent cannot verify that the sender did not spend the same coins somewhere else,

23
Securities law contains a number of exemptions to registration, such as a private placement for
accredited investors. See Luvai, supra note 13, at 20. This option, while attractive, would unfairly limit
investment to only the wealthiest individuals or corporations.
24
Kenyon Briggs, Taming the Wild West: How the SEC Can Legitimize Initial Coin Offerings, Protect
Consumers from Bad Actors, and Encourage Blockchain Development, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
TAX L. REV. 424, 443 (2018).
25
See Zoë Bernard, Everything You Need to Know About Bitcoin, Its Mysterious Origins, and the Many
Alleged Identities of its Creator, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-history-cryptocurrency-satoshi-nakamoto-2017-12#whywould-the-inventor-of-the-worlds-most-important-cryptocurrency-choose-to-remain-anonymous-12
[https://perma.cc/U6FM-F4NR].
26
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AP8W-LRF8] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
27
David Perry, Why Bitcoin Has Value, NASDAQ (Jan. 13, 2017, 11:17 AM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/why-bitcoin-has-value-cm733313 [https://perma.cc/YS44-M49N]
(noting that Bitcoin creates value by “splitting a finite currency supply more ways”).
28
Joseph Guzzetta, How Bitcoin Works: A Technological Description of Blockchain-Based
Cryptocurrencies for Non-Technical Lawyers, 59 ORANGE COUNTY L. 34, 35 (2017).
29
Id.
30
Id. Guzzetta references the collapse of Mt. Gox, a popular Bitcoin wallet and exchange platform, as
one prominent example of why private keys are valuable to the user and system. Id.
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a problem referred to as the “double spending” problem. 31 To resolve this issue in
the absence of a trusted third party, Nakamoto theorized that all Bitcoin transactions
must be publicly recorded. More importantly, the network must reach a consensus
on a single history of transactions that accurately reflects the true order in which
Bitcoins were received and spent.32
Anticipating the double spending problem, Nakamoto built a solution into the
Bitcoin network. Nakamoto introduced a public ledger system where each Bitcoin
transaction is collected into a “block” which is then distributed to various nodes in
the network.33 Using a complex cryptographic process known as “hashing,” a group
of nodes (“miners”) attempt to reconcile the previous block of transactions with the
new block by solving a difficult mathematical puzzle. 34 This process is known as
“proof of work” and requires an enormous amount of computing power to properly
execute.35 The result is a permanent and immutable history of every Bitcoin
transaction, mathematically “chained” together and organized into blocks. 36 To
undermine such a system, an actor would have to alter the entire transaction history
(the hash) of that particular coin by redoing the proof of work for that block and
every subsequent block–a task that increases exponentially in difficulty as more
blocks are added to the chain.37 This trusted and immutable record of transactions is
referred to as the blockchain.
As mentioned, mining and validating a block of transactions requires an
immense amount of computing power and thus an immense amount of electricity. 38
To incentivize miners to perform this difficult cryptoanalysis, the Bitcoin blockchain
rewards the first miner to solve the block’s mathematical puzzle with newly minted
Bitcoin.39 The release of new Bitcoins serves the dual purpose of distributing new
coins into circulation (because no central authority exists, such as a bank, to mint
new coins) while also rewarding miners for the electricity and CPU power
consumed.40 Glynn Bird, in an article written in the IBM Watson and Cloud
Learning Center provides a succinct summary of the mining process:
As well as securing the list of transactions cryptographically, block chains also
provide a distributed consensus of the state of the database. It ensures that value
transfers happen once or not at all, giving the application developer the peace of
Nakamoto, supra note 26.
Id.
33
Mike Orcutt, Blockchain: What Is It?, MIT TECH. REV., May/June 2018, at 18, 19.
34
Id. at 20; see also Guzzetta, supra note 28, at 36.
35
Orcutt, supra note 33, at 21.
36
Id. at 22.
37
Nakamoto, supra note 26, at 3; Guzzetta, supra note 28, at 37 (observing that by adding the previous
block’s hash to the new block, the chain becomes “locked down” such that any fraudulent changes
reverberate through the network and become quite obvious). The difficulty of altering a previous block
is the central reason why the ledger itself remains secure over time.
38
For example, a Bitcoin mining operation with 7,000 machines in St. Hyacinthe, Quebec, uses about
ten megawatts of electricity a day, more than double the usage of a neighboring hockey arena on a soldout night. Kathryn Miles, The Little Coin That Ate Quebec, MIT TECH. REV., May/June 2018, at 34, 38.
39
Orcutt, supra note 33, at 19.
40
Nakamoto, supra note 26, at 4 (“The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is
analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and
electricity that is expended.”).
31
32
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mind that, once stored, their data is both immutable and trusted. The block chain
network effectively picks a random node to generate the next block in the chain by
giving that privilege to the node that solves a mathematical task that takes a lot of
computing power. The node that finds a solution to the problem nominates the next
block in the chain and publishes it, where it is verified by others in the network. The
winning node is rewarded for this “proof of work” with freshly minted cryptocurrency and transaction fees collected from the transactions’ creators.41

The significance of the mining process is that instead of trusting a bank,
government, or other financial third party to validate a transaction, trust is
mathematically guaranteed throughout the network. 42 The blockchain itself
functions as the trusted intermediary through which transactions are executed and
verified. Consider the following description of the blockchain:
Blockchain is a technology that allows computers connected over the Internet to
reach agreement over shared data. A block is a defined storage space over a
distributed network of such computers. Every time these computers—called
nodes—cryptographically reach agreement over a transaction, a new block gets
added to the last transaction in the chain of blocks. In this way, each transaction gets
permanently recorded and sequentially updated, thereby keeping an inerasable
historical trail of transactions starting from the very first transaction.43

Put a different way “[the] blockchain is an open, distributed ledger that can
record transactions between two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent
way.”44 Because it is so difficult to alter a previous transaction block, the ledger is
virtually immune from fraudulent changes.
However, it is also worth noting the Bitcoin ledger is functionally restricted–it
can only track and authenticate the movement of Bitcoins from one address to the
next. Nakamoto’s primary impetus for creating the blockchain was to solve the
double spending problem inherent in non-tangible digital assets.45 Nakamoto was
not concerned with creating a general purpose blockchain that could verify any kind
of transaction, he was only interested in developing a new digital currency.
B. Blockchain Applications in the Market
Since 2013, Bitcoin has experienced an astronomical rise in value–on May 20,
2013, a single Bitcoin was worth 131 U.S. dollars, 46 but by December 17, 2017, it

41
Glynn Bird, Block Chain Technology, Smart Contracts and Ethereum, IBM DEVELOPER (May 19,
2016), https://developer.ibm.com/clouddataservices/2016/05/19/block-chain-technology-smartcontracts-and-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/MVM4-QWGY].
42
What is Bitcoin Mining?, BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/
[https://perma.cc/C7E4-Z9M4] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (“The primary purpose of mining is to allow
Bitcoin nodes to reach a secure, tamper-resistant consensus.”).
43
Jaipat Jain, Introduction to Blockchain for Lawyers, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, (May 10, 2018), at
20180510P NYCBAR 1).
44
Marco Iansiti & Karim Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/64WC-XTFN].
45
Nakamoto, supra note 26, at 2.
46
Bitcoin Price, MARKETS INSIDER, https://markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/btc-usd
[https://perma.cc/N8QB-YGQ2 ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
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was worth almost twenty thousand U.S. dollars.47 The almost absurd rise in value
led many financial experts to declare the currency an economic bubble, the result of
intense speculation and an overhyped market.48 One need only take a look at recent
Bitcoin headlines to see the media’s obsession with the currency’s value, its illicit
use, and the general confusion regarding its existence. 49 Much of this criticism is
warranted; the currency’s history is marred by fraud, contraband, and fortunes won
and lost.50 However, this fixation obfuscates the truly innovative nature of Bitcoin’s
underlying technology: the blockchain itself. 51
While the Bitcoin network may have been the blockchain’s first practical
application, it soon became apparent the technology had significant potential to
support the world’s increasingly complex web of transactions. For one, any
application run on the blockchain does not require its own storage; transaction
records are stored across the distributed network. 52 Furthermore, the decentralized
ledger distribution provides a trusted consensus–a function currently performed by
third party intermediaries.53 Additionally, anonymity is inherent to the structure of
the blockchain, and while this feature has been widely disclaimed by the media as a
tool of online drug dealers, it is easy to envision a different application in which
anonymity is essential.54
Smart contracts have emerged as one viable application for the blockchain;
negotiated terms and conditions are encoded onto the blockchain and important
events are automatically executed upon the occurrence of specified conditions. 55 The
David Morris, Bitcoin Hits a New Record High, But Stops Short of $20,000, FORTUNE (Dec. 17,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/17/bitcoin-record-high-short-of-20000/ [https://perma.cc/B55P9KY4].
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Is Bitcoin a Waste of Electricity, or Something Worse? N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/economy/bitcoin-electricityproductivity.html [https://perma.cc/2NMR-CU3W]; Noah Smith, Yep, Bitcoin was a Bubble. And it
Popped, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-11/yepbitcoin-was-a-bubble-and-it-popped [https://perma.cc/BZ2X-92BX].
50
See, e.g., Manoj Sharma, 5 Bitcoin Disasters of All Time; Why It’s Never Safe to Invest in Virtual
Currency, BUSINESS TODAY, https://www.businesstoday.in/exclusive/rebrain-or-rot/bitcoin-disastersvirtual-currency-cryptocurrency-invest-in-bitcoin/story/265555.html [https://perma.cc/G8R5-6EV9 ]
(last updated Dec. 22, 2017); Nathaniel Popper & Rachel Abrams, Apparent Theft at Mt. Gox Shakes
Bitcoin World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/business/apparenttheft-at-mt-gox-shakes-bitcoin-world.html [https://perma.cc/2ACX-Z292].
51
See also Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 44 (describing blockchains not as disruptive technology that
will usurp traditional business models but as a foundational technology with “the potential to create new
foundations for our economic and social systems”); Michael Casey & Paul Vigna, In Blockchain We
Trust, MIT TECH. REV. 10, 12 (May/June 2018) (“The real promise of blockchain technology, then, is
not that it could make you a billionaire overnight or give you a way to shield your financial activities
from nosy governments. It’s that it could drastically reduce the cost of trust by means of a radical,
decentralized approach to accounting–and, by extension, create a new way to structure economic
organizations.”).
52
Bird, supra note 41.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
We Have a Few Words for You, MIT TECH. REV. 25, 25 (May/June 2018) (defining smart contracts as
“a computer program stored in a blockchain that automatically moves digital assets between accounts if
conditions encoded in the program are met. It serves as a way to create a mathematically guaranteed
47
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Ethereum Project is one popular platform for building and executing smart
contracts.56 Applications created in Ethereum “can hold value, store data, and
encapsulate code to perform computing tasks,” 57 functionality applicable to a broad
range of services. Like all public blockchains, the cryptography and hashing
algorithms needed to ensure the accuracy and reliability of transactions requires
immense computing power distributed across the network. In the case of Ethereum,
the network pays for computing power through the exchange of the network’s native
token “Ether.”58 Ether is “the crypto-fuel for the Ethereum network” and is
exchanged between developers and miners alike. 59 Thus, any application running on
the Ethereum platform requires Ether to validate transactions or execute contract.
Similar to Bitcoin, Ether may be acquired through mining (successfully completing
the proof of work needed to verify a block of transactions) or purchased on a
secondary exchange.60
In many ways, the Ethereum platform was the spark that illuminated the
potential of blockchain technology. On a commercial level, companies across
various industries have begun to develop blockchain products. For instance, in the
financial sector, both Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan recently contributed capital to
blockchain start-up Axoni, helping the company to raise thirty-two million dollars in
funding.61 Even more notably, Axoni partnered with the Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”), a behemoth in the post-trade securities processing
industry, to convert DTCC’s Trade Platform Warehouse (which services virtually
every derivatives dealer across the globe) to a blockchain platform. 62 Axoni’s
technology advertises robust data privacy, full lifecycle management, and automated
regulatory reporting as some of blockchain’s many benefits.
Even the State Department has begun exploring blockchain technology as the
Department updates their IT infrastructure. 63 For example, a spokesman for the
Department identified foreign aid as one possible application for blockchains,
helping to combat fraud, corruption and inefficiency within the distribution chain. 64
In a similar vein, the World Food Programme recently instituted “Building Blocks”–
a blockchain application designed to reduce the transaction costs associated with

promise between two parties.”); Tiffany L. Minks, Ethereum and the SEC: Why Most Distributed
Autonomous Organizations are Subject to the Securities Act, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 406 (noting that
“[o]nce certain terms within the contract are fulfilled, the smart-contract automatically moves to the next
step without any human input required.”).
56
Bird, supra note 41.
57
Id.
58
Minks, supra note 55, at 413-14.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 414.
61
Michael Castillo, Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan Join $32M Series B in Enterprise Blockchain
Startup Axoni, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/08/14/goldman-sachs-and-jp-morgan-join-32mseries-b-in-enterprise-blockchain-startup-axoni/#5dfb230a6276 [https://perma.cc/8VLH-DQ2V].
62
Id. DTCC processes roughly 1.6 quadrillion securities transactions annually. Id.
63
Henry Kenyon, State Department Ponders Using Blockchain Technology, CQ ROLL CALL (Oct. 12,
2017).
64
Id.
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providing foreign aid.65 Running on a private version of Ethereum, 66 Building
Blocks allows the WFP to transfer cash directly to individuals who then verify their
identity using an iris scanner.67 As of October 2018, more than 100,000 refugees in
Jordan redeemed foreign aid through this program, reducing transaction fees by
ninety-eight percent.68
Beyond humanitarian aid, even the legal profession has taken notice of the
blockchain. For example, in a recent Above the Law post, finance professor Michael
McDonald noted how much of the work attorneys perform involves facilitating the
secure transfer of assets69–a service that could be made obsolete through blockchain
and smart contracts. Another commentator noted that “the underlying technology
behind Bitcoin, known as blockchain, is being used by a growing number of
companies, banks and financial institutions, and it could fundamentally change the
legal industry in the coming years.”70 Indeed, several companies have begun to offer
blockchain based products directly to the legal industry. 71 For example, blockchain
start-up Integra recently introduced a “utility” blockchain built on IBM’s own
blockchain platform.72 Integrating directly into a company’s existing document
software, Integra is designed to improve data exchanges between law firms and
corporate legal departments.73 Integra’s software does not run on a publicly available
blockchain nor is it powered by a cryptocurrency, rather, it is a privately held
network “governed by the legal industry itself.”74
On a policy level, 250 companies, law firms, and universities recently created
Russ Juskalian, The Place Where Life Hangs by a Chain, MIT TECH. REV. 42, 44 (May/June 2018).
Private blockchain networks will be explained shortly, but in this context, it refers to the WFP’s
control over the network’s participants.
67
Id.
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Id.
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Michael McDonald, Lawyers and Bitcoin and Blockchain, ABOVE THE L. (Jul. 25, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/lawyers-and-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/S78J-DMFL](“From mortgage
closings and business sales to divorce proceedings and securities law, asset ‘management’ in many ways
enters regularly into the practice of law.”).
70
Victor Li, Bitcoin’s Blockchain Technology Being Used in Business, Finance and Contracts, ABA J.
(Mar. 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/bitcoins_underlying_technology_blockchain_gains_use_in
_business_finance_and [https://perma.cc/X8CA-SM9M].
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See LegalZoom to Offer Smart Legal Contracts with Clause, PRNEWSWIRE (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/legalzoom-to-offer-smart-legal-contracts-with-clause300713717.html [https://perma.cc/L8K9-R3DV]; Smart Legal Contracts: How the Law Benefits with
Blockchain, IBM BLOG (June 27, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/06/smart-legalcontracts-how-the-law-benefits-with-blockchain-2/ [https://perma.cc/EU5A-FJCR]; NetDocuments
Announces Blockchain Integration Proof of Concept, NETDOCUMENTS (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.netdocuments.com/en-us/blog/blockchain-integration-proof-of-concept
[https://perma.cc/S69X-S5AX].
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Aug. 29, 2019).
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the Global Legal Blockchain Consortium to “develop standards to govern the use of
blockchain technology in the business of law.” 75 The group helps to facilitate the
integration of blockchain platforms (including the Integra ledger mentioned above)
into existing legal software.76 While much of the technology pioneered by these
companies remains in its infancy, the trend is unmistakable–blockchain ledger
technology is here to stay and the legal industry would be remiss if it was not at least
generally familiar with its functions and principles.
C. Blockchain Classifications
While all blockchains generally share similar characteristics (a distributed
ledger and cryptographic mechanisms for achieving network consensus 77),
progressive research has led to a functional divergence as new blockchain projects
attempt to meet the needs of private industry–creating what are now known as public
and private (or “permissioned”) blockchains. 78 In contrast to public blockchains
where any participant can join, private blockchains require the network’s permission
before a participant is granted entry and allowed to execute the network’s protocols.79
Private blockchains, which are popular among industries where “security, identity,
and role definition are important,” 80 are often configured to restrict access to certain
information and provide network participants with a defined role.81 For example,
Ripple is a private blockchain that uses a native crypto-token as a “bridge currency”
to assist financial institutions with cross border payments. 82 The Ripple network
only permits certain “validators” such as Microsoft or MIT to participate, allowing
the network to control new entrants. 83 However, private blockchains such as Ripple
have faced criticism for not being decentralized enough. 84
By contrast, public blockchains such as Bitcoin are open to any participant
willing to download the software and execute the consensus protocol. Transactions
may be viewed by anyone in the network and certain addresses quickly become
linked to specific individuals or organizations. Additionally, they require an
75
What is the GLBC?, GLOBAL BLOCKCHAIN CONSORTIUM, https://legalconsortium.org/what-is-theglbc/ [https://perma.cc/Z8ZJ-GCSJ](last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
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Cryptocurrencies Are Not Created Equal, MIT TECH. REV., May/June 2018, at 26, 26.
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Michael del Castillo, Ripple’s Distributed Ledger Network Passes 50-Validator Milestone, COINDESK
(July 17, 2017, 8:03 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ripples-distributed-ledger-network-passes-50validator-milestone [https://perma.cc/A82K-NBAQ]; see also Samburaj Das, Ripple Unveils Strategy to
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84
Das, supra note 83. A more practical criticism of private blockchains is that the central entity
responsible for controlling the ledger’s participants is vulnerable to cyberattacks. WORLD BANK,
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND BLOCKCHAIN, at X (2017).

2020]

FOR LOVE OR FOR PROFIT?

167

immense amount of electricity for their proof-of-work and in terms of sheer volume,
process far more transactions than private blockchains. Finally, these ledgers most
often require crypto-tokens to incentivize network nodes to perform the necessary
proof-of-work. While the trust mechanism may be more powerful within a public
network, public ledgers lack scalability and continue to struggle with slow
transaction processing times.85
While a public ledger is essential for Bitcoin to function as a currency, it does
little to incentivize private industry adoption where parties have defined roles and
little tolerance for slow processing speeds. This is why permissioned or private
blockchains are favored among private industry and business enterprises–they permit
only identified parties to participate in the network, allow for certain transactions to
remain confidential, and are able to scale up processing output to meet network
demand.86 Furthermore, permissioned blockchains generally do not require a native
cryptocurrency to incentivize proof-of-work. Instead, each node is incentivized by
the desire for lower costs, higher speed and ease of information sharing. 87 By
reducing network size and scope, permissioned networks increase processing speed
and overall efficiency.88 However, greater speed and efficiency come at a cost:
Permissioned ledgers require a centralized service or authority to grant network entry
and trust is achieved through the network’s unique consensus algorithm rather than
through a public consensus.89 While the central entity does not process or
authenticate transactions, it is still the keyholder to the network itself. Finally,
permissioned blockchains are often limited in their ability to transfer digital assets–
a necessary feature in the execution and/or deployment of smart contracts. 90
Whether a blockchain utilizes a private or public ledger has additional
consequences relevant to this Comment, specifically the need for a crypto-token. For
example, Hyperledger is a fast growing blockchain platform launched by the Linux
Foundation and “has become the de-facto standard for enterprise blockchain
platforms.”91 Like Ripple, Hyperledger Fabric is a private ledger marketed to
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enterprises with known participants, confidential transactions, and a growing need
for fast, decentralized transaction verification. 92 Hyperledger is “cryptocurrency
agnostic” meaning the platform does not require a cryptocurrency for the ledger to
function.93 However, token use is not entirely precluded; developers are permitted
to “code in” tokens for specific applications, perhaps as a way to manage digital
identities, assets, or value transfers. 94
One Hyperledger platform, Sawtooth, heralds itself as “highly modular,” and
“aims to keep distributed ledgers distributed and to make smart contracts safe for
enterprise use.”95 However, because Sawtooth is a blockchain platform designed for
generalized enterprise use, some smart contracts deployed on Sawtooth will involve
value transfers and will likely require crypto-tokens to facilitate such a purpose.96
However, smart contracts laden with crypto-tokens are not necessarily permitted to
interact with other smart contracts on the platform. 97 This problem is further
exasperated by Sawtooth’s generalized operability–the platform supports smart
contracts written in different programming languages which, without a shared
language, will have difficulty interacting with one another.98 To solve this problem,
developers from the company Pokitdok published a detailed proposal and guide for
integrating general token functionality into Hyperledger Sawtooth. 99
The Pokitdok whitepaper draws attention to limitations of blockchains operating
without any token functionality. Say, for example, a supply chain adopted a
permissioned blockchain structure to automate and track goods as they traveled
through commerce. As with all permissioned networks, the central authority will
invite network participants while allocating roles and refining permissions among
the participants. If the supply chain needs to interact with a secondary smart contract
or a third party, the new entrant will need to be verified and invited into the private
network before any value or monetary exchange can occur. Furthermore, if the
secondary smart contract uses a programming language different from the other
network participants, it will have trouble transferring value or communicating with
the central, permissioned blockchain. The Pokitdok white paper attempts to simplify
this process by introducing a crypto-token that, when deployed and exchanged by
smart contracts operating on a Sawtooth network, will permit value transfers and
identify verifications between different “families” of smart contracts. 100 The token
Hyperledger Fabric, in particular, was recently chosen as the foundation for IBM’s own blockchain
platform. Id.
92
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itself effectively assumes some of the functions of the central entity, permitting
communication, value transfers, and ensuring trust between otherwise isolated
applications.101
Another Hyperledger progeny titled “Project Indy” recently introduced a
blockchain platform designed specifically for decentralized identity verification,
aiming to solve the fundamental question of “who am I dealing with?” when doing
business online.102 The lead developer of Project Indy, an organization called the
Sovrin Foundation, has begun to explore the possibility of introducing tokens to the
Indy network as a means of payment for the network’s decentralized, identity
verification services.103 Eschewing traditional online payment systems that are often
slow and tend to prioritize only high value verifications, banks or other institutions
would instead pay for identity verification services using Project Indy’s tokens. 104
Purchased from the Indy network itself or from a secondary market, the amount of
tokens required will vary according to the size and complexity of the verification
requested.105 Project Indy attempts to find a beneficial compromise between private
and public ledgers.106
One theme emerging from the various Hyperledger projects is that digital value
transfers and identity verifications often require a crypto-token even in the context
of permissioned blockchains. Therefore, it would not be unusual for a private
blockchain to hold an ICO as a means of distributing such tokens and raise necessary
capital. For private, industry level blockchains, ICO token sales would likely be
directed towards other industry participants with whom the network is likely to do
business. This affords such entities a planning opportunity with respect to securities
laws, namely, to secure a registration exemption as a “private placement.”
D. Blockchain Token Classifications
Similar to private/public blockchains, crypto-tokens can take many forms.
Broadly speaking, crypto-tokens are simply digital substitutions for fiat currency that
use cryptography, rather than a central bank or reserve, as its security measure.107 A
crypto-token is a single unit of the cryptocurrency. 108 The most significant difference
is quite obviously the digital characteristics of crypto-tokens; they are intangible and
ownership is determined according to cryptographic rules rather than physical
possession.109 The SEC has chosen not to classify cryptocurrencies but instead
See also Luke Owens, Cryptoasset Framework on Intel’s Hyperledger Sawtooth,
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defines them according to their particular function within a blockchain, resulting in
significant regulatory ambiguity. 110 For example, in its first significant discussion
of cryptocurrencies/tokens as securities, the SEC stated:
Accordingly, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to issue
this Report in order to stress that the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various
activities, including distributed ledger technology, depending on the particular facts
and circumstances, without regard to the form of the organization or technology
used to effectuate a particular offer or sale.111

Because of this fact-specific analysis, the SEC has defined some crypto-tokens
as “securities” under the traditional Howey Test while labeling others as
“commodities.”112 Thus, before applying any regulatory framework, it is first
necessary to accurately describe a crypto-token’s purpose within a blockchain. For
example, it is possible that a particular crypto-token is not a crypto-token at all but
is better described as a “commodity,” a designation exempting that network’s
blockchain from a host of laws and regulations.113
To begin, tokens are simply “representation[s] of digital asset[s].” 114 In the
context of the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains, the networks’ tokens are
synonymous with their underlying cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ether respectively.
Tokens do not have intrinsic value but may be used to represent anything of value
such as currencies (digital or otherwise), commodities, or even identities as
mentioned above.115 Under the general umbrella of tokens, blockchain developers
and industry proponents identify three types of tokens within a distributed ledger:
user tokens, equity tokens, and debt tokens. 116 User tokens are “a form of digital
currency needed to access the service provided by the distributed network.”117
Conversely, equity tokens finance the network’s development and can be viewed as
“cryptographic shares of a network.” 118 Finally, debt tokens are similar to “short
term loans” with associated interest rates.119
One commentator identifies two categories of tokens: investment and utility. 120
An investment token is analogous to a traditional security like corporate stock, LLC
membership interests, or partnership interests. A utility token is intended to facilitate
Id. at 124.
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access to a product or service on the digital platform or network thus deriving value
primarily from consumptive use, meaning that it may be analogized to a gift card or
software license.121

Utility tokens possess a “non-incidental” technical function within the
blockchain and are best analogized as the fuel that powers the network’s applications,
services, or contracts, whereas equity tokens may represent an ownership interest
and/or the right to receive profits. 122 Most commentators and blockchain experts
draw distinctions between utility and equity tokens. 123
For purposes of this analysis, two general types of tokens will be defined and
discussed: utility and equity tokens. Utility tokens are necessary for a user to engage
with the services offered by a blockchain platform. Equity tokens, by contrast, are
“stock” in the network, representing an ownership share and entitling the owner to
“proceeds” from the network. Both types of tokens may increase in value as a
blockchain increases in scale and efficiency. The nuanced distinctions between
utility and equity tokens becomes dispositive when analyzing whether a particular
ICO qualifies as a sale of securities under the Howey Test.
II.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF AN INITIAL COIN OFFERING
A. The Age of the Initial Coin Offering

In many ways, an ICO is no different than a traditional IPO–both offerings have
the goal of raising capital to fund a company’s future development by selling
“shares” of the company to the public. One recent commentator defined ICOs as “a
sale of digital assets (‘coins’ or ‘tokens’) to the public by an entity seeking to raise
capital.”124 The origins of the ICO date back to a 2013 Bitcoin conference in San
Jose in which a young panelist by the name of J.R. Willett proposed that innovative
protocols could be written on top of Bitcoin, containing new features which could be
used as advertising to venture capitalists.125 The developers would then offer a piece
of equity in the new protocol to any investor willing to send Bitcoin to the
developer’s address.126 Developers would use the Bitcoin capital to fund the project
itself.127 It would be years before blockchain startups would realize the massive
121
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potential in Willett’s idea but when they finally did, the momentum was electrifying.
While an IPO is a significant milestone for any company, most often occurring
many years into a company’s lifespan, ICOs, by contrast, are often the first step a
blockchain-based company takes in its business growth and development. Indeed,
with the rise of so many blockchain projects, companies are increasingly turning to
ICOs to raise initial capital for the development of products.128 For example, in 2017,
roughly 350 ICOs were held across the world, raising almost $6 billion in capital.129
This figure was quickly surpassed in the first ten months of 2018: 450 ICOs raised
almost $14 billion in capital. 130 In terms of capital raised, the average ICO size is
also rising rapidly: increasing from $5.96 million in 2016 to $25.72 million by the
end of 2018.131 This staggering increase in capital and the number of ICOs held is
indicative of their potency and effect on the market. For example, the total market
capitalization for cryptocurrencies rose from $17.7 billion to over $650 billion by
the end of 2017, a 2700% increase over the year, a feat that took the S&P 500 several
decades to achieve.132
The specific structure of an ICO depends on the nature and function of the token
being offered. Most ICOs begin with the publication of a white paper describing the
project and the token offered.133 Tokens are generally offered as either utility tokens
(granting the purchaser future access to the blockchain’s services) or as equity tokens
(representing a “share” in the company). 134 Coindesk, the leading informational and
news site for blockchain technology,135 recently detailed the differences between
equity and utility token ICOs.136 With respect to utility ICOs, after publishing a
white paper, companies will typically release the network’s source code to the
general public before deploying the network itself. 137 Once the network is initially
active, tokens can be acquired through mining or by purchasing them directly from
a miner.138 As demand for the network’s services grows, so does the demand for its
utility tokens, increasing their value within the network. Selling utility tokens at
such an early stage allows developers to gauge demand for the network.139 If a large
number of users participate in the ICO, developers are gifted the capital needed to
scale the network accordingly, but if demand does not reach a certain threshold,
developers have the option of halting the project and refunding any capital.140 Thus,
developers are able to avoid wasting substantial capital on a project with little
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potential or appeal.
Equity tokens, by comparison, bear a stronger resemblance to a traditional IPO.
After publishing a white paper, the company will typically create a smart contract to
be administered and deployed by the central developers.141 The developers will then
advertise the sale of equity tokens, representing an ownership interest in the project,
using the capital received to grow the network’s functionality.142 As the efficacy of
the network increases, so does the value of the token.143 Equity ICOs are effectively
selling an ownership stake in the blockchain project, representing a right to receive
future profits as opposed to a mechanism needed to access the network’s services.
Thus, participants in an equity ICO are more likely to consider their tokens as an
investment rather than as a tool or a commodity.
Besides publishing a white paper, there are other similarities between equity and
utility ICOs. For one, both utility and equity tokens may be sold in secondary
markets, leading to an often capricious fluctuation in value. 144 Additionally, almost
all token purchases require the buyer to exchange either U.S. currency or other
cryptocurrencies (typically Bitcoin or Ethereum) for the token offered in the ICO. 145
Finally, while equity tokens represent more of a traditional “share” in a company,
both types of tokens have the potential to appreciate as the network’s profitability
grows. The difference is that a utility token’s increase in value is more incidental to
the broader success of the network rather than an end in and of itself.
B. Examples of Successful ICOs
Before examining the flawed ICOs launched in the last several years, it is worth
drawing attention to a few of the more successful ones that may exemplify a positive
model for how ICOs should operate. In terms of sheer capital raised, the largest ICO
to date occurred in 2018 by the Cayman-based EOS company.146 EOS raised a
staggering $4.2 billion in capital147 through an ICO in which purchasers exchanged
Ether tokens from the Ethereum network for new EOS tokens. 148 Commentators
were astounded by the amount raised, especially for a company that had not formally
launched a product yet.149 EOS is a platform for running decentralized applications
such as smart contracts and has heavily marketed itself as a direct competitor to
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Ethereum.150 With a novel consensus algorithm, a discrete group of dedicated miners
(twenty-one, to be specific), and a different proof of work system, EOS promises a
more expedited and scalable network interface that can process one million
transactions per second with the potential for even more. 151 It remains to be seen if
the EOS blockchain will emerge as a viable product. Over 100 applications are
currently hosted on the EOS blockchain with the largest having 6000 daily active
users.152 However, the network faced criticism for its consensus mechanism which
values speed over integrity while others noted how the centralized authority
functions as a single point of failure. 153 The EOS token itself is best described as an
equity token; it has no actual use within the network but any developer looking to
launch its own application on the EOS blockchain must use the EOS tokens to
generate its own application’s tokens. 154 Thus, the token serves a gatekeeping
function.
Setting aside the amount of capital raised, the 2014 Ethereum ICO represents
one of the most effective and practical token offerings to date. The Ethereum
offering was not an ICO in the modern sense of the term but is better described as a
“crowd-sale” rather than a formal token offering. For its time, the Ethereum crowdsale was a massive success raising $18 million through the exchange of Bitcoin for
Ethereum’s Ether token.155 The $18 million, managed by the platform’s governing
non-profit,156 was used to launch “Frontier,” the network’s first smart contract
protocol which formally opened to developers eighteen months after the crowdsale.157 While not termed an ICO at the time, the Ethereum crowd-sale had many
similarities to a typical ICO. For example, the sale was preceded by a white paper
detailing the proposed technology. 158 Perhaps anticipating the problems associated
with Ether tokens being labeled as investments or securities, the Ethereum
developers included the following disclaimer on its website: “Ether is a product,
NOT a security or investment offering. Ether is simply a token useful for paying
transaction fees or building or purchasing decentralized application services on the
James Risberg, What is EOS? Everything You Should Know, COIN CENTRAL (Oct. 28, 2018),
https://coincentral.com/what-is-eos/ [https://perma.cc/R6L9-RRN9].
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[https://perma.cc/4ME3-HXAL] (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (noting that the value of EOS tokens has
fallen from a high of over twenty dollars in May 2018 to a little less than three dollars in November
2018).
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Ethereum platform; it does not give you voting rights over anything, and we make
no guarantees of its future value.”159
Despite this disclaimer, early purchasers of Ethereum were richly rewarded for
their investment; the crypto-token launched in 2015 with a value of less than a dollar,
rose to over $1250 before settling at $168.99 as of April 22, 2018 – currently the
second most valuable cryptocurrency. 160 Writing for the Texas A&M Law Review,
Tiffany L. Minks reasoned that Ether is best viewed as a stock or share in a company
because of its frequent exchanges on secondary markets. 161 Despite this
characterization, the SEC has brought no enforcement actions against Ethereum.
What has made Ethereum so successful is the prolific effect the platform has
had on blockchain technology broadly. For one, Ethereum is credited with first
reducing smart contracts to practice and its ERC-20 token is often the standard
followed by blockchain platforms looking to adopt a crypto-token. Additionally, the
ERC-20 token standard provides developers launching their own unique token with
a common set of parameters, permitting seamless interactions with other smart
contracts and decentralized applications.162 The ERC-20 token has made substantial
contributions to the development of blockchain technology; without the initial capital
generated from the Ethereum crowd sale, blockchain technology would still be in its
infancy.
C. The DAO report: A Failed ICO
For many years, the SEC was largely silent on regulating ICOs–likely because
of the substantial uncertainty regarding the proper characterization of
cryptocurrencies. However, this hands-off approach changed in July 2017 with the
SEC’s release of the DAO Report.163 The DAO Report is an excellent case study in
ICOs, their intersection with U.S. securities law, and how, despite claims of robust
cyber security, permissioned blockchains remain vulnerable to cyber-attacks. DAO
stands for Distributed Autonomous Organization and is effectively a virtual
corporation whose structure and participation is dictated entirely by computer
code.164 Created by a German company known as Slock.it, the DAO functioned as
a venture capital fund administered entirely through the blockchain. The DAO’s
objective was to use the capital generated from the sale of equity tokens in an ICO
to purchase a body of assets. 165 The equity tokens were purchased using Ether, the
Victoria van Eyk, Ethereum Launches Own ‘Ether’ Coin, with Millions Already Sold, COINDESK
(Jul. 23, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-launches-ether-coin-millions-already-sold
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idea being token holders would vote on what assets the DAO would invest in and
would then be entitled to any “dividends” resulting from that investment. 166 The
DAO blockchain was a permissioned ledger that functioned according to the
parameters of a smart contract written by the Slock.it creators. 167
The DAO ICO was held over the course of a month (April 30, 2016 to May 28,
2016) and issued approximately 1.15 billion DAO tokens in exchange for $150
million of Ether.168 Like most ICOs, the DAO first published a whitepaper, 169
created a website, and heavily advertised its project while encouraging participation
in its ICO.170 Slock.it permitted the DAO’s code to be open source, delivering it to
the Ethereum community for examination or possible reuse. 171 Concerns about the
code’s integrity began to emerge near the end of the offering period and in response,
Slock.it instituted a moratorium on project funding until the vulnerabilities could be
fixed.172 Despite these precautions, on June 17, 2016, an unknown attacker managed
to exploit a vulnerability in the code and successfully diverted nearly a third of the
network’s pooled Ether ($3.6 million) to an address held by the attacker. 173
What began as an admirable attempt to revolutionize the structure of corporate
governance and investing, ultimately ended in disaster. It is no wonder the SEC
chose this case as their first formal foray into ICOs. Indeed, in their application of
the “securities” definition under the Howey Test, the SEC closely examined the true
functionality of the DAO tokens. 174 The SEC noted that the voting rights among
token holders were limited – voting was restricted to investment proposals that were
approved by the Slock.it founders.175 Additionally, because many of the network’s
participants were anonymous to one another, it was difficult for the token holders to
join together to exercise “meaningful control” over the network.176 The SEC
contended that the rights of the token holders were more akin to traditional corporate
shareholders who were forced to rely on the managerial efforts of Slock.it as the
founders of the network. 177 Thus, the SEC concluded the DAO tokens had many
characteristics of securities and were best classified as such.
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THE HOWEY TEST AND SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A. Defining “Securities” and “Investment Contracts”

While the DAO Report was the SEC’s first substantive inquiry into initial coin
offerings, it was not long before the Commission turned its regulatory powers to
other ICOs. Before detailing these regulatory actions, it is first necessary to explain
the framework the SEC uses when evaluating ICOs, specifically the regulatory
regimes of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “’33 Act”), the Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“’34 Act”) and most importantly, the three prongs of the famous Howey Test. The
‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act require issuers and sellers of securities to undertake a number
of affirmative actions before selling or trading in instruments classified as securities.
For example, the ‘33 Act requires any issuer of securities to complete a detailed
registration statement with the SEC or otherwise file for a specific exemption. 178 The
‘33 Act also authorizes private actions against sellers of securities for misleading
statements or material omissions contained in registration statements. 179
Compounding the powers of the ‘33 Act, the ‘34 Act imposes further anti-fraud
liability against issuers and sellers of securities, as well as additional disclosure
requirements.180 For example, the ‘34 Act’s Rule 10b-5 authorizes private actions
for “devices, schemes . . . to defraud” or for “any untrue statement of material
fact.”181 Taken together, commentators note that “many businesses regard the
detailed and complex disclosures required in registration statements, and the large
fees charged by securities lawyers, as burdensome.” 182
Both the Acts impose substantial requirements for securities issuers and the
consequences for violating such rules have the potential to be substantial. Thus,
whether a particular financial instrument or investment falls under the purview of the
SEC is a critical business determination not to be neglected. This determination most
often turns on whether the particular instrument qualifies as a “security” or not.
Decided in 1946, the seminal Supreme Court case S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.
establishes the formal definition of “securities” for purposes of both the ’33 Act and
the ’34 Act.183 The defendant in Howey was a corporation that owned a citrus
orchard, portions of which were offered to the public as a means to “finance
additional development.”184 Buyers were offered a sales contract for the land itself
in conjunction with an exclusive service contract giving the corporation a leasehold
interest and authority to cultivate and sell the citrus fruit produced by the land. 185
Buyers (most often out-of-state businessmen and professionals) were enticed by the
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corporation with the promise of substantial profits from the sale of the citrus fruit. 186
In its action against the corporation, the SEC sought injunctive relief preventing the
corporation from selling unregistered securities using the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.187
The Supreme Court evaluated the entirety of the corporation’s offering
(advertisements, land deed, service contract, etc.), concluding that the defendant’s
offering qualified as an unregistered investment contract under both the ’33 and ’34
Acts.188 The Court defined an investment contract as: “a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promotor or a third party.”189 This fourpart test (the “Howey Test”), sets the standard for what qualifies as an investment
contract for the sale of a security: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profit (4) to be derived solely from the efforts
of others.190 In its reasoning, the Court noted that such a broad and overly inclusive
definition “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” 191 Applied liberally, the
Howey Test has found investment contracts across all manner of unusual financial
agreements.192
In a subsequent case involving the definition of “securities,” the Supreme Court
expounded upon the legislative purposes of the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, reasoning that
because the Acts took aim at the unregulated, profit-driven enterprises of capital
markets, the application of those statutes must turn on the “economic realities
underlying a transaction” and not on whether the seller actually termed his product
a security, share, or stock.193 The methodology for applying the Howey Test results
in highly fact-specific analysis, with one author noting:
The intentional breadth and adaptability of the definition of investment contract
necessarily leads to complex and fact-intensive judicial inquiries in the application
thereof and allows for the possibility of inconsistent results between and among the
various courts engaging in such inquiries, creating the possibility of similarly
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situated litigants winding up with dissimilar outcomes. 194

Litigation involving the Howey Test most often focuses narrowly on one of the
test’s four principle components rather than on the legitimacy of the test itself. 195
The first prong, an investment of money, is rarely at issue, as courts have routinely
found an investment of money if a buyer provides consideration or gives something
of value.196 As applied generally to ICOs, commentators agree the exchange of fiat
currency for tokens, or even the exchange of virtual currency, satisfies this first
element.197 Courts have analyzed the second prong, common enterprise, as requiring
either horizonal commonality (sharing of risk between the investor and other
investors) or vertical commonality (sharing of risk between the investor and the
seller/promotor).198 More plainly, commonality requires the success or failure of the
investment or project be borne together by all involved. 199
B. An Expectation of Profits from the Efforts of Others
The third and fourth prongs of the Howey Test result in significant difficulties
for ICOs. These difficulties are overshadowed by Bitcoin’s capricious valuation and
illicit uses–widely reported in the media–and further compounded by the average
investor having little knowledge of blockchain technology. Finally, the ostentatious
advertising often used by ICOs heavily promotes the profitability of crypto-tokens
to eager and sometimes ill-informed consumers. In United Housing Foundation v.
Forman, the Court elaborated upon the expectation of profits prong of the Howey
Test. “In such cases the investor is ‘attracted solely by the prospects of a return’ on
his investment. By contrast, when a purchaser is motived by a desire to use or
consume the item purchased–‘to occupy the land or to develop it themselves’. . . the
securities laws do not apply.”200 At issue in United Housing was a large urban
housing project administered by a non-profit co-op. To acquire an apartment, buyers
purchased “shares” from the co-op, entitling them to an apartment within the
complex.201 Residents brought suit after their monthly rental charges increased
substantially, alleging, inter alia, the illegal sale of securities in violation of the ‘33
Act. In holding that the housing shares were not securities, the Court rejected three
arguments originally accepted by the lower court that “profits” were found in: the
tax deductions available to tenants for their mortgage interest payments; the rent
savings derived from renting an apartment at a lower cost; and the reduction in
monthly rents derived from commercial leasing of other parts of the co-op.202 What
distinguished the commercial transaction at issue in United Housing from traditional
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securities transactions was that the co-op buyers were primarily motived by the
desire to obtain housing, i.e. to purchase a commodity for personal consumption. 203
While renters undoubtedly saved money in a variety of ways by purchasing co-op
stock, those benefits were incidental to the transaction’s true purpose.
In a recent law review article, author Nate Crosser argued that, to qualify as a
security, the expectation of profits must be the primary motivation for the
purchaser’s investment and if a purchaser is instead motivated by a desire to consume
the product, securities laws do not apply. 204 Crosser further noted that when
construing buyers’ expectations, the SEC pays particular attention to advertising
efforts and any “third-party comments ratified by promoter.”205 More broadly,
author Ori Oren, writing for the Columbia Business Law Review, suggested that
whether investors expect the protection of securities laws is also a relevant factor for
determining their applicability.206 Support for this proposition comes from the
Supreme Court case Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985),
in which the Court held federal securities law applied to the purchase of all
outstanding stock in a lumber business. In dicta, the Landreth Court reasoned that
because the shares of the lumber company were referred to as “stock” and had the
characteristics of traditional stocks, persons trading in those shares had a strong
expectation that the transaction would be governed by the federal securities laws. 207
This is an interesting argument with respect to ICOs as utility tokens are rarely
referred to as “stocks” or “shares” in the network but they occasionally come with
rights similar to traditional shareholders. However, this argument runs counter to
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Howey that federal securities laws embody a
flexible approach that look to the economic realities of a transaction rather than any
labels assigned to it. Similarly, the SEC has conclusively stated that labels are
irrelevant for its enforcement actions.208
The final element of the Howey Test–profits derived from the managerial
efforts of others–again presents significant hurdles for most ICOs. For example in
the DAO Report, the SEC noted investors relied upon Slock.it (the company who
created the DAO) to provide managerial services to the network and to introduce
investments which would generate profits.209 These services included writing the
protocols that governed the network, producing the whitepaper and advertising
materials, and providing cyber security in the form of ongoing monitoring. 210 One
commentator, Ori Oren, disagreed with characterizing these services as “managerial
efforts,” noting that “[t]he economic reality of the scheme was that Slock.it and the
Curators only contributed to the maintenance of the system, while the ‘failure or
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success of the enterprise’–returns on investments–depend long term upon the tokenholding investors themselves.”211 Oren argues “pre-purchase services” do not, by
themselves, represent “ongoing” managerial services for purposes of the Howey
Test.212
Oren’s argument would be more persuasive if the DAO survived its initial
launch and had the opportunity to develop its network and protocols more fully. At
the time of its ICO, the DAO was almost entirely the product of its founders’ efforts;
the decentralized “reins” of the network had not yet passed to the users and thus it
was difficult for the SEC to see the DAO as anything but the product of the efforts
of Slock.it. Although DAO token holders were afforded voting rights akin to
democratic control, the SEC viewed these rights as limited and insignificant. 213 In
support of this point, the SEC cited to S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, in
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that efforts 214 expended by
participants in a multi-level marketing scheme–while the sine qua non of the
scheme’s ultimate profitability–did not make the scheme anything less of an
investment contract.215 This suggests that ICOs–even ones in which the entire
success of the venture depends on the efforts of the investors/users–may still be
investment contracts. However, the SEC’s analysis of the DAO infrastructure may
be superficial as noted by Oren:
The reality was that the experimental and novel model needed ‘training wheels’ and
safeguards to ensure this democratic and decentralized control would successfully
function. These efforts were technical and governance-focused, not investment
focused. Aside from the initial, exemplary investment concept said to be introduced
by Slock.it, the future investment concepts were to be pitched, chosen, and executed
by token holders and their code contributions.216

It may well be that if the DAO had come to fruition and the efforts of Slock.it
were replaced by the decentralized control of its token holders, investors would no
longer depend on the managerial services of a third party. The problem with this
argument is that blockchain technology and DAOs are highly complicated and
technical. To successfully shift managerial efforts from developers to users will
require users to have the necessary skills and knowledge to operate the blockchain
network. This will be a high hurdle for ICOs to overcome given the average
investor/token holder likely has little knowledge of this highly technical field.
The SEC currently adopts a fact-based, qualitative approach to determine if an
ICO qualifies as a security offering. For example, in its official FAQ for ICOs, the
SEC declines to classify all ICOs as securities offerings, instead stating that based
on specific facts and circumstances, ICOs may be securities offerings and may need
to be registered.217 This approach appears to reflect the Supreme Court’s reasoning
Oren, supra note 206, at 643.
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213
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in United Housing, noting that while tokens sold in ICOs can be called many things
(utility, debt, equity, etc.) “merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to
provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.” 218 Current
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton offered the following example in a public statement
issued in December 2017:
For example, a token that represents a participation interest in a book-of-the-month
club may not implicate our securities laws and may well be an efficient way for the
club’s operators to fund the future acquisition of books and facilitate the distribution
of those books to token holders. In contrast, many token offerings appear to have
gone beyond this construct and are more analogous to interests in a yet-to-be-built
publishing house with the authors, books and distribution networks all to come.219

As of November 2017, Jay Clayton stated that he had yet to see an ICO that did
not qualify as a security offering. 220
C. Enforcement Actions Against ICOs
Subsequent to the DAO Report and the explosion of capital raised by ICOs, the
SEC began an enforcement crusade against various ICOs. The initial actions were
directed at coin offerings the SEC deemed to constitute the unregistered sale of
securities. These ICOs were often tainted by fraudulent business practices and
deceptive marketing schemes that were the product of bad actors looking to
capitalize off of crypto-mania rather than earnest blockchain developers hoping to
fund their project.
For example, in September 2017, the SEC filed a complaint against Nevadabased ReCoin LLC for the unregistered sale of securities and fraudulent
misstatements in connection with an ICO that raised $300,000 from investors. 221 The
ReCoin tokens were billed as a secure investment vehicle backed by actual
commodities purchased using capital generated from the ICO. 222 The project’s
whitepaper stated that the token’s value could be expected to grow as the underlying
commodities increased in value or as demand for the tokens rose.223 Contrary to their
representations, ReCoin never purchased any real estate, diamonds, or other
commodities to back the value of the coins and misled potential investors into
believing that millions had been raised as a result of the venture. 224
The SEC’s civil case against ReCoin was postponed after the Department of
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Justice filed criminal charges alleging securities fraud against ReCoin’s founder.225
The defendant, Maksim Zaslavskiy, immediately filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
the ReCoin tokens were not investment contracts and thus not subject to federal
securities law.226 Ruling on the motion, the court noted that the issue of the token’s
proper classification was a factual inquiry best resolved by a fact-finder.227 At the
motion to dismiss stage, the court framed the issue as “whether the ‘elements of a
profit-seeking business venture’ are sufficiently alleged in the Indictment, such that,
if proven at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that ‘investors provided the capital
and shared in the earnings and profits; and the promoters managed, controlled and
operated the enterprise.’”228 Reasoning that the indictment sufficiently alleged all
the elements of an investment contract under the Howey Test, the court drew
attention to ReCoin’s whitepaper which advertised the token sale as an “attractive
investment opportunity,” comparing the company’s statements to similar speech
found in the DAO whitepaper.229 Additionally, the court found it significant that the
success of ReCoin’s venture was entirely dependent on the efforts of Zaslavskiy and
the management team; investors had no control over their investment activity nor did
the ReCoin tokens provide any functionality aside from a pro-rata stake in the
company itself.230
In S.E.C. v. AriseBank, the SEC continued their crusade against fraudulent ICOs
with a well-publicized complaint and asset seizure. Defendant AriseBank raised
roughly $4.25 million between June 2017 and January 2018 through private pre-sale
sales of its propriety token “AriseCoin,”231 a figure contrary to the $410 million
AriseCoin claimed to have raised immediately prior to its public ICO. 232 In addition
to the unregistered sale of securities, the SEC also alleged fraudulent misstatements
by AriseBank including claims to have purchased an FDIC insured bank and the
acquisition of a Visa backed, cryptocurrency credit card.233 To combat these grossly
exaggerated misstatements, the SEC sought immediate injunctive relief in the form
of restraining orders and asset freezes. 234
AriseBank attempted to be the world’s first “decentralized banking platform.”
What is particularly interesting is how the company’s whitepaper outlined the
token’s increase in value:
Our goal with AriseCoin is to drive overall circulation by incentivizing [AriseCoin]
holders to spend their extra rewarded eACO bonus coins before they expire. This
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causes eACO currency to be used rather than just held in static accounts, which in
turns [sic] drives and grows the market value of AriseCoin economy and thus
increase [sic] the value of ACO holdings.235

This nebulous and vague description is indicative of the fraudulent nature of the
AriseBank ICO. However, the description also suggests that the AriseCoin was to
have an ostensible function within the AriseBank blockchain. Perhaps the
AriseBank developers intended their coin to have some utility within their
blockchain network as whole, but any such intention was quickly overshadowed by
the fraudulent actions of its founders.
Additionally, bolstered by the SEC’s classification of certain tokens as
“securities,” private plaintiffs have also begun filing claims against ICOs for the sale
of unregistered securities. For example, in Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., a recent class
action brought in the Southern District of Florida, the plaintiffs alleged violations of
Section 12(a)(1) and 15(a) of the Securities Act and sought injunctive relief for the
unregistered sale of securities.236 At first glance, the Centra Tech ICO presents as a
typical blockchain project and ICO launch: Centra Tech attempted to design and
launch a crypto-currency debit card that would allow users to spend cryptocurrencies using existing credit cards such Visa and Mastercard.237 This ambitious
objective quickly grew out of control as the project’s founders attempted to validate
the project using spurious claims and deceptive advertising. For one, Centra Tech
claimed to have a partnership with Mastercard and Visa that would allow Centra
Tech’s crypto-debit card to operate on top of the credit giants’ existing debit
networks.238 In reality, these partnerships never existed and were entirely fabricated
by the company’s founders. 239 Perhaps in an attempt to mask these deficiencies,
Centra Tech embarked on an aggressive advertising campaign that included a
“Bounty Program” in which social media users were paid to publish favorable
articles about Centra Tech technology.240 The company even managed to hook social
media icon Floyd Mayweather who was paid in cash to promote Centra Tech on
various social media platforms.241 All of these efforts helped to raise thirty-two
million dollars for the company’s founders. 242
In response to the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, the magistrate
Id. ¶ 27.
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judge analyzed the likelihood of the success on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims,243
quickly concluding the Centra Tech tokens qualified as securities under the Howey
Test and the ICO qualified as an investment contract.244 However, the brevity of the
magistrate’s report leaves much to be desired, specifically with respect to how the
“expectation of profit” prong might apply differently to a token having a strong
utilitarian function. Indeed, as one commentator noted, the magistrate judge simply
assumed that an expectation of profit existed without analyzing how and by whom
that expectation was created.245 This assumption seems justified considering how
Centra focused extensively on the token’s profitability in its advertising materials.
However, the Centra Tech action did not resolve how a token whose increase in value
is incidental or secondary to its primary function would perform under the Howey
Test.246
Given how the Centra Tech ICO was steeped in fraudulent practices, it is no
surprise that the project’s young developers were recently indicted by the SEC.247
The architects of the Centra Tech scheme never intended to produce a viable
blockchain-based product–they were only interested in harnessing the zeal
surrounding cryptocurrencies as a tool to defraud investors and make a quick buck.
Moreover, the Centra Tech tokens had no semblance of functionality at the time of
the ICO. As one commentator from the law firm DLA Piper noted: “[t]he courts that
are currently evaluating whether tokens qualify as securities are focusing their
attention on non-functional token sales tainted by fraud allegations. In the [Rensel
case], the [Centra] tokens had no utility at the time of their sale and the promised
technology had yet to be developed.”248
In light of the securities fraud and crafty schemes perpetrated by the abovementioned ICOs, it may seem as though the entire industry is comprised of swindlers
and charlatans. While the most egregious actors grab headlines and draw the ire of
the SEC, not all ICOs are tainted by fraud. For example, on December 11, 2017, the
SEC published its administrative agreement with California-based blockchain startup Munchee, Inc.249 Munchee spent several years developing a blockchain based
restaurant review application for the iPhone.250 Through the use of its app, Munchee
hoped to compete with Yelp and Google by designing a solution to the
243
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disproportionate number of negative and/or fraudulent reviews directed at restaurant
owners.251 The Munchee network incentivized end users to post pictures and review
restaurants by rewarding them with a Munchee token; end users could then spend
this token at participating restaurants while the restaurants themselves would be able
to exchange tokens for advertising within the network. 252
Most significantly (and in stark contrast to the above ICOs), the Munchee
application was successfully launched in the second quarter of 2017, well in advance
of its whitepaper and its ICO.253 This is to say that the Munchee ICO was not a
spontaneous cash grab; the company worked for several years to develop and launch
its product but chose to hold an ICO in order to raise further capital and to improve
their product–a fact acknowledged by the SEC in its administrative settlement. 254
The Munchee application itself was blockchain based but developed without tokens
in mind–end users were directly incentivized by the restaurants themselves offering
small items in exchange for reviews. 255 Andrew Chapin, a consultant on the
Munchee ICO and writer for Medium, noted that:
When management learned of the ICO market, they saw an opportunity to improve
their product through token integration. If a partner restaurant incentivized users
with a token, they reasoned, it might encourage more activity. The end-user could
review Restaurant A and Restaurant B, earn Munchee tokens by doing so, and
redeem those tokens at Restaurant A, B, C, or even D.256

Thus, the Munchee ICO appeared to be a sincere and good faith attempt at
expanding the application’s functionality without using traditional methods of
fundraising.257
What eventually sank the Munchee ICO is a combination of several factors.
The company’s whitepaper took its token integration too far by outlining an
economic “ecosystem” highlighting the token’s expected increase in value as well
its acceptance in secondary markets.258 This “expectation of future profits” was
promoted to the public in articles such as 7 Reasons You Need to Join the Munchee
Token Generation Event and through podcasts by one of Munchee’s founders. 259 In
particular, the SEC remarked how Munchee’s advertising was not directed to
existing users of the network or to the restaurant industry itself. Instead, Munchee
promoted its ICO on platforms aimed at cryptocurrency and digital asset investors,
Verma et al., Munchee Token: A Decentralized Blockchain Based Food Review/Rating Social Media
Platform, 6-7 (last updated Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theventurealley.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/Munchee-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/45P5-AHCE].
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suggesting the sale was more of a cash grab than an attempt to introduce its product
to relevant consumers.260
Another theory is that the SEC was upset with the hubris on display in the
Munchee whitepaper. Foreseeing how their ICO could be classified a security, the
company made a number of spurious statements regarding the application of the
Howey Test–even going so far as to draw readers’ attention to the SEC’s DAO
report.261 For one, the whitepaper declares “[t]his White Paper does not constitute
the offering of a security.” 262 More significantly, the whitepaper also states that “a
Howey analysis had been conducted to determine that, as currently designed, the sale
of [Munchee] utility tokens does not pose a significant risk of implicating federal
securities laws.”263 Obviously, this proved to be quite erroneous and in actuality the
whitepaper contained no analysis of the Howey Test as it applied to the Munchee
tokens–the company simply concluded that it was not offering securities without any
proof. Additionally (and ironically), Munchee’s whitepaper contained a “ForwardLooking Statement Disclaimer” that expressly characterized its whitepaper as a
“forward-looking statement” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.264 The irony of this is that despite concluding the Munchee
token was not a security within the meaning of the Howey Test, the Munchee
developers nonetheless attempted to avail themselves of a legal defense available
only to securities offerings, suggesting that Munchee wanted to have their cake and
eat it too.
Ultimately, Munchee acquiesced to the SEC’s cease and desist order,
immediately refunding the $60,000 it had raised from forty investors. 265 In addition
to the expectation of profits created by the “ecosystem” Munchee developed, the
SEC further noted that such profits depended entirely on the managerial efforts of
others, commenting that “[i]nvestors had little choice but to rely on Munchee and its
expertise.”266 Despite the practical utility of the Munchee token, the economic
realities of the ICO transformed the Munchee token into a security.
One principle that emerges from the actions of CentraTech, Recoin/Zaslavskiy,
AriseBank, and Munchee is that simply labeling a token a “utility token” does not
erase its status as a security in the presence of certain facts. However, it is unclear
whether tokens that are not only labeled “utility” but also possess a clear functional
purpose and history would also be classified as securities. The Munchee token came
very close; its token had a functional purpose and was identified as a “utility” token
by its whitepaper.267 However, the utilitarian aspects of the Munchee token were
overshadowed by the profit-seeking nature of its sale. Hopefully, clarification
regarding legitimate utility tokens will come with time as regulations and ICO
jurisprudence are still in their infancy; recent legal actions have targeted only the
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most egregious ICOs, i.e., those engaged in obviously fraudulent business practices.
IV.

SOLUTIONS AND FORECASTING
A. SAFT Framework

In the divided regulatory regime of the United States, the private sector is often
in the best position to address regulatory imbalances and uncertainties. In October
2017, a group of blockchain industry participants published a whitepaper entitled
“The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework.” The Simple
Agreement for Future Tokens (“SAFT”) framework attempts to craft a regulatory
framework for token sales within the boundaries of existing securities law. 268 The
framework is based off of the Simple Agreement for Future Equity (“SAFE”), a
securities tool that has recently become popular with tech startups. The SAFE is a
type of alternative financial note somewhere in the middle between convertible debt
and normal equity; an investor contributes capital to a start-up venture and in
exchange, receives a contractual note entitling the investor to equity once the
company is formally valued through priced investment or liquidation. 269 The
ultimate value of the equity received is determined during the first round of financing
with reference to the company’s total valuation.270 Similarly, SAFT is an investment
contract that obligates investors to fund early stage blockchain projects. 271
Developers use the contributed capital to build a “genuinely functional network, with
genuinely function utility tokens” that are delivered to the investor once the network
and tokens are deployed and functional. 272
Interestingly, the SAFT framework does not eschew the label “security” but
rather embraces it.273 The authors assert that token sales–if structured properly under
the SAFT framework–will initially be classified as securities but once the network
is functional, the tokens will instead be classified as “consumptive products . . .
demand[ing] compliance with state and federal consumer protection laws.” 274 The
SAFT framework addresses utility tokens specifically, and draws a clear distinction
between “pre-functional utility tokens–those issued before a platform is operational–
and fully functional utility tokens–those issued after the platform is functional.” 275
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As an investment contract, the SAFT must comply with securities laws. 276 However,
once the functional tokens are delivered to investors, they are re-classified as
commodities subject to consumer protection laws.277 To support this shifting
classification, the SAFT whitepaper argues that pre-functional tokens will always
satisfy the Howey Test because their value is contingent upon the successful efforts
of its promoters.278 Conversely, the value of functional tokens is determined by
myriad market factors that–according to the SAFT authors–will outweigh the
“efforts of others” component of the Howey Test.279
The SAFT framework contains a legal analysis of the Howey Test that could be
seen as impressive simply for the fact that–unlike virtually every other blockchain
project–the SAFT authors actually took the time to establish some legal precedent
for their arguments.280 For instance, the SAFT whitepaper explains that direct token
presales will always satisfy the “expectation of profits prong” of the Howey Test
because, per the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United Housing Foundation v.
Forman, purchasers of pre-functional tokens are predominately motivated by the
expectation of profits, i.e., the tokens have no functional purpose other than a
speculative increase in value.281
From this point, the SAFT whitepaper transitions into a discussion of the Howey
Test’s fourth prong, “the efforts of others.” 282 Drawing upon the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in S.E.C v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, the whitepaper argues that the
correct approach to this element asks “whether the efforts made by those other than
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”283 The authors argue that
purchasers of already functional tokens are predominately motivated by a
consumptive desire to utilize the tokens for their various functions: “as network fees,
membership coupons, value staking mechanisms, currencies, etc.”284 Similar to
gold, silver, and other commodities–the value of functional utility tokens in this
context is dependent upon traditional principles of supply and demand rather than
the success or failure of the seller’s efforts.285
This distinction is critical because, according to the SAFT framework,
developers/promoters have already expended their “essential efforts” into the
enterprise, and while developers may continue to improve the network, the effect of
those efforts upon the value of the token is dwarfed by market fluctuations beyond
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the developer’s control.286 The existence of a secondary market/exchange platform,
the authors claim, is a red herring for purposes of the Howey Test because such
platforms are simply the venue for executing a token exchange and have no bearing
on the token’s price fluctuations.287 Conversely, purchasers of pre-functional tokens
must rely upon the efforts of developers for their tokens to have any utility or value
in the future; at this stage, the success of the project is inextricably tied to the token’s
value.
Intuitively there is some legitimacy to these arguments, especially if tokens are
thought of narrowly like traditional commodities such as gold and silver. However,
several commentators have noted the potential pitfalls of the SAFT framework. 288
For example, the Cardozo Blockchain Project, an initiative from Cardozo Law
School exploring the legal issues of blockchain technology, published a 2017 critique
of the SAFT framework entitled “Not so Fast–Risks Related to the use of a ‘SAFT’
for Token Sales.”289 The Cardozo report raises a number of concerns regarding token
sales under the SAFT framework. Broadly speaking, the authors are concerned the
SAFT framework erroneously suggests that the application of the Howey Test turns
only on the four bright-line rules established in the original action, SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.290 What the SAFT framework ignores, the authors assert, is that the
Howey Test is a highly fact-dependent inquiry that looks at the “substance” and
“economic realities” of a transaction rather than its labels–an approach repeatedly
affirmed by both the Supreme Court and the SEC. 291 Indeed, the SAFT framework
is very dependent on the somewhat arbitrary distinction between functional and nonfunctional tokens. The SAFT authors speculate that once tokens have legitimate
functionality, purchasers’ predominate motivations will be consumptive rather than
profit-driven. This could very well be true for certain tokens (again, the inquiry is
always fact-dependent) but the presence of even genuine functionality does not
entirely eliminate purchasers’ expectation of profits.
Additionally, the Cardozo report takes aim at some of the legal analogies drawn
by the SAFT authors, as well as the framework’s unusual shift from selling an
investment contract that is at first a “security” but eventually becomes a
“commodity” by virtue of its functionality. 292 Curiously, the initial investment
contract (pre-network development) is directed exclusively towards accredited
investors who must contractually disclaim any intention to use the contract
Id. at 10.
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288
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consumptively and affirm their intention to realize only profits from the investment
contract.293 Because of this disclaimer, tokens offered under the SAFT framework
will presumably stress the profit-making potential in its marketing materials.
Touting the investment and profit potential of tokens during a SAFT sale process
may well impact a federal securities law analysis of a token developed pursuant to
a SAFT . . . in many cases, the SAFT sales process and related marketing materials
could impact the ‘economic realities’ of purchasing or selling these tokens.294

To the Cardozo authors, “bifurcating the purchase of tokens through a SAFT”
only alters the form of the transaction rather than its substance, and as noted in
Howey, “form [should be] disregarded for substance.” 295 Moreover, targeting only
accredited investors (often wealthy and powerful individuals and corporations) with
the initial investment contract will result in tokens becoming concentrated in the
hands of the few–the antithesis of the decentralized, democratic spirit at the heart of
blockchain technology. Furthermore, this may cause investors to be concerned only
with the profitability of the token’s eventual sale rather than with the network’s
success generally, and because such investors will likely hold a significant share of
the network’s tokens, they can exert a high degree of influence to achieve their goals.
Finally, the Cardozo report criticizes the SAFT framework’s comparisons to
legal cases in which sales contracts for the purchase of to-be-delivered “natural
resources” were held not to implicate federal securities laws. 296 Specifically, the
Cardozo report argues that the SAFT framework paints with a broad brush when it
asserts that crypto-tokens are analogous to homogenous commodities such as gold,
silver, or sugar–noting that crypto-tokens often confer various “rights, features, and
obligations” not present in physical commodities. 297 It is worth noting that the SAFT
distinction between pre- and post-sale seller efforts finds some support in S.E.C v.
Life Partners, Inc., in which the D.C. Circuit held, “pre-purchase services cannot by
themselves suffice to make the profits of an investment arise predominantly from the
efforts of others, and that ministerial functions should receive a good deal less weight
than entrepreneurial activities.”298 At first, this statement appears to support the
framework’s conclusion that a SAFT token does not derive profits solely from the
“efforts of others” because such efforts are “pre-purchase services.” However, as
noted by the Cardozo authors, the SAFT framework’s crucial timing distinction
between the managerial efforts expended by developers prior to token functionality,
and managerial efforts expended after token deployment, was expressly rejected by
the Eleventh Circuit in S.E.C v. Mutual Benefits Corporation.299 In that case, the
court reasoned “investment schemes may often involve a combination of both preId. at 5; see also Juan Batiz-Benet et al., Exhibit 1, 4 (Oct. 2, 2017),
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and post-purchase managerial activities, both of which should be taken into
consideration in determining whether Howey’s test is satisfied.”300 Again, the SAFT
framework simply states, without any justification, that efforts expended by
developers to maintain or promote the token's post-token deployment will be de
minimus and subordinate to the market effects of supply and demand.
It may be true that such post-deployment efforts are “ministerial efforts” that are
“non-essential” and insufficient to satisfy the Howey Test. However, even with the
court’s reasoning in Life Partners, if those post-deployment efforts possess any
semblance of an “entrepreneurial activity” then a court could easily make a finding
that the token is a security. Under the SAFT framework, developers will be hardpressed to ensure that any post-sale efforts are exclusively administrative and
insignificant in nature. Otherwise, the token runs the risk of being classified as a
security. While the SAFT framework is not without its pitfalls, it does present a
novel approach that could be useful to developers looking to hold an ICO in
compliance with securities laws.
B. Partnership Law
The SAFT framework seems over-engineered at times and relies on arbitrary
distinctions not fully supported by caselaw. A more simplified solution is presented
in a recent article published in the Columbia Business Law Review. 301 The article,
ICO’s, DAO’s, and the SEC: A Partnership Solution, proposes that ICOs organize
themselves under what the author terms a “decentralized partnership.”302 The
partnership agreement is offered to the public digitally in the form of a smart contract
containing an ICO token.303 The smart contract (vis-a-vis tokens) will outline and
govern the key aspects of a partnership agreement including: the right to transfer
interests, the sharing of profits and liabilities, and specific governing rights. 304 Most
importantly, “[a] Decentralized Partnership has an essential quality differentiating
the form from a corporation: there is no separation between ownership and
control.”305 The decentralized partnership solution presents a prescient model for
the future of collective, democratic investments. For one, any liabilities (legal or
otherwise) would be borne across all token holders, creating joint and several liability
across the network.306 Additionally, avoiding securities registration creates more
egalitarian investment opportunities. Current exemptions to SEC registration require
companies to issue securities via private placements only to accredited investors, i.e.,
those with a net worth over one million dollars or substantial annual income.
However, such rules exclude the general public and are inapposite to the
decentralized, democratic nature of blockchains. 307
The partnership solution consolidates ownership and control, distributing the
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burden among all invested parties. This suggests ICOs created through partnership
agreements will not satisfy the “efforts of others” prong of the Howey Test. As equal
partners in the venture, the success of the ICO will depend upon all partners rather
than the central promoter or developer. This approach is consistent with the spirit of
blockchains, which prefer democratic control rather than a central authority.
However, to avoid a security classification, the roles and rights of a partnership must
be truly egalitarian at the time of investment. Similar to the issues present in the
SAFT framework, if developers retain any semblance of managerial control over the
network post-partnership formation, it will be difficult to characterize their efforts as
“pre-purchase services.”
C. Finding Room for Utility Tokens
The SEC has the choice of whether to include crypto-tokens within the definition
of securities or to craft new regulations directly applicable to ICOs. In terms of
avoiding securities registration, utility tokens are the only crypto-tokens with the
potential to do so. Assuming utility tokens are not swept up in the definition of
securities, developers should first ensure a stable blockchain platform exists that is
independent of any crypto-token. Additionally, any whitepaper published by a
developer should focus on explaining the token’s functionality within the network–
any potential increase in value should be de-emphasized as a natural consequence of
the token’s use. When creating new registration requirements specific to ICOs, the
SEC should mandate that tokens have verifiable functionality. To that end, one
commentator writing for the Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review
suggests requiring a standardized whitepaper for all ICOs. 308 At a minimum, the
author suggests that the standardized whitepaper should inform purchasers “(1) what
problems the company’s blockchain project solves; (2) what rights a token holder
will and will not receive; (3) when the blockchain project will be completed; and (4)
why a token is necessary in the first place.”309 Additional disclosure requirements
could include information about the company’s founders, corporate structure, etc. 310
A standardized whitepaper would impose no additional burdens on ICOs
because, as referenced throughout this analysis, all reputable ICOs already publish
whitepapers. Additionally, a standardized form has the added benefit of eliminating
the “facts and circumstances” analysis currently used by the SEC. As the steward of
our capital markets, the SEC has a duty to ensure emerging businesses are not
operating in the dark. Moreover, heightened disclosure requirements will force out
fraudulent ICOs who will be unable to accurately and truthfully describe their
projects. ICOs are currently plagued by misinformation that unfairly casts legitimate
operations in a bad light. It seems unlikely that legitimate ICOs would oppose
disclosure requirements that would help separate the wheat from the chaff.
Title III of the JOBS Act granted a registration exemption under section 4(a)(6)
of the ’33 Act for companies selling securities through crowdfunding mechanisms. 311
Briggs, supra note 24, at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
310
Id.
311
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding, SEC.GOV (Oct.
30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/75R6-NM77].
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Termed “Regulation Crowdfunding,” the exemption limits the total amount of
securities sold to $1,070,000 and caps each individual sale at the greater of $2200 or
five percent of the purchaser’s yearly income or net worth. 312 Additionally,
transactions made under this exemption must be executed using intermediaries, in
this case, SEC approved crowdfunding portals. 313 Crowdfunded securities are also
subject to substantial alienation restrictions for one year following the sale. 314
While some commentators have noted the problems of having such a low
transaction ceiling,315 start-up blockchain projects with little to no capital may find
the sale cap insignificant–at least for the first round of investments. Moreover, the
disclosure and reporting requirements under this exemption are much less
burdensome than typical securities sales.316 Finally, Regulation Crowdfunding
abrogates the issuer’s ability to advertise the sale publicly by limiting advertisements
to plain statements of sale price made only through the SEC’s approved portal. 317
This may seem unnecessarily restrictive, but given how poor and deceptive
advertising practices have hurt ICOs in recent years, perhaps this limitation is
warranted. However, it is more difficult to reconcile the SEC’s intermediary
requirement because blockchain technology inherently rejects middlemen. Despite
these restrictions, the well-tailored Regulation Crowdfunding evidences the SEC’s
ability to craft regulations that are suitable to new methods of raising capital and with
a bit of tinkering, similar carve-outs could be created for ICOs.
With respect to marketing and advertising, ICO promotors should be meticulous
with token marketing and design. Any advertising of the ICO should be directed to
potential users of the network and should avoid claims of profitability or ostentatious
endorsements by celebrities. If blockchains are to find credibility in the marketplace,
developers should work to distance their projects from these sentiments, especially
if the SEC decides to include utility tokens within the definition of securities. This
could be facilitated by extending Rule 10b-5 liability to include utility tokens. 318
However, this move also risks over-inclusivity–ICOs would have to defend against
potentially hollow accusations of fraud, even in the face of heightened pleading
requirements. To mitigate litigious threats, the SEC could expand the safe harbor
for forward looking statements to apply to utility token sales. 319 A forward-looking
statement is “[a statement] accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those in the forward-looking statement.”320 Because blockchain technology is in its
17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a) (2018).
Id. § 227.100(a)(3); Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S.
Federal Securities Law Analysis, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 86 (2019).
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infancy and prone to unforeseen failures, good faith statements about a project’s
future success that later turn out to be false, should not result in liability to the
project’s developers.
CONCLUSION
Above all, Congress and the SEC have a duty to protect investors without
stifling economic growth.321 It seems unlikely blockchains or ICOs will fall by the
wayside and thus, the SEC should work towards eliminating fraudulent ICOs while
supporting the inclusion of legitimate blockchain projects. In a best-case scenario,
this would take the form of new regulations specifically tailored to ICOs. These
regulations should include heightened disclosure requirements, lowered registration
costs, and a moderate degree of liability. The United States court system is illequipped to analyze ICOs according to existing securities law. Additional
jurisprudence, in the absence of new legislation, will only muddy the waters further
and leave blockchain projects and their attendant ICOs uncertain of their legal status.
Thus, the SEC should begin crafting new exemptions to accommodate ICOs and
their unique structure.322

See Briggs, supra note 24, at 442.
To its credit, the SEC recently launched the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology
(“FinHub”). See Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology, SEC (Oct. 31 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/finhub [https://perma.cc/KBL6-HREX]. FinHub is an online portal designed to
help the SEC engage with technology innovators and their new methods of capital formation. Id. It also
includes a framework for “analyzing whether a digital asset is a security.” Id. FinHub represents an
important first step in the ongoing dialogue between the SEC and blockchains.
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